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More than forty years ago, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court called
for the disbarment of ethicist Monroe Freedman for publicly espousing the view
that criminal defense lawyers should present the client's false testimony in the
same manner as any other testimony.' In his famous "Three Hardest Questions,"
Freedman carefully considered the lawyer's trilemma-the duty to know
everything about the case, to keep the client's confidences, and to reveal perjury to
the court-and concluded that such a course was the best ethical choice once a
lawyer first unsuccessfully remonstrated with the client.
The Freedman resolution was, and by many accounts, remains consistent with
the beliefs and practice of the overwhelming number of criminal defense
lawyers-notably for indigent clients. This is true despite the fact that the Model
Rules, adopted by nearly all jurisdictions, elevated candor toward the tribunal over
client confidentiality. Model Rule 3.3, and its state variations, requires that a
lawyer who knows that his client has offered materially false testimony to take
"reasonable remedial measures," even if doing so require revelation of client
confidences. Despite the purported clarity of the rule, the debate about the
lawyer's obligation continues. Few lawyers ever obtain the requisite "actual
knowledge" of client intended or completed perjury that triggers the rule's
obligation. When, however, that level of knowledge exists, what must, may, or
should a lawyer do? Is withdrawal necessary? If so, is it sufficient?
The three hardest questions became more complicated with the advent of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1986. These guidelines, with the goal of national
uniformity in sentencing, became a much-criticized system that vested greater
powers in prosecutors and tied the hands of sentencing judges. "Cooperation" with
federal prosecutors became the coin of the realm, notably in drug cases. This was
because a prosecutor's acknowledgement to a court that a defendant had provided
"substantial assistance" was the sole vehicle for a defendant to obtain a sentence
not only below a guideline range, but below the lengthy statutory mandatory
minimum sentence. The practice of law became a "race to the courthouse" with
the first defendants in the door typically receiving the coveted 5K1.1 letter and the
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likelihood of a significantly lower sentence. Needless to say, such a culture
produced a variety of distortions including, of course, defendants lying or
embellishing to obtain the benefit of cooperation.
2
Yet it is curious that while ethicists reinforce that ethical choices must be
viewed in context, rarely are a lawyer's ethical obligations understood clearly in
the context of this cooperation culture.
The criminal defense lawyer's initial obligation in a federal drug case is to
establish a trusting lawyer-client relationship despite all obstacles. Time is of the
essence. The cooperation system causes yet another dilemma: the obligation to
learn all of the facts and investigate fully versus the time-constrained obligation to
be the first in line to obtain a 5K1.1 letter. The lawyer must explain the federal
system with its mandatory minimum sentences and guideline ranges. She has an
obligation to present this information while walking the tightrope of establishing
trust. If the client is new to the federal criminal justice system, it is difficult
enough to believe that her court appointed counsel is trustworthy and one to whom
she should reveal confidences within the initial meetings, no less a suggestion that
her best option is to provide information about herself and others to the agents who
arrested her and the prosecutor who indicted her. The lawyer culture may term this
"cooperation" or substantial assistance. In common parlance it is "snitching" or
"ratting out" others. It rarely is done willingly. It is potentially life threatening,
otherwise dangerous, and has serious social and psychological consequences.
Many clients, knowing that cooperation is their only hope, raise the issue in
the first meeting with the lawyer. The jailhouse grapevine provides clients with
information about cooperation, including the fact that cooperation against the
lawyer may secure significant benefits.3  The zealous advocate must have self-
protective instincts. The system causes such distortions and some clients will take
full advantage of those to the lawyer's detriment.
The lawyer may morally oppose a system that relies primarily on snitches, but
nevertheless has an obligation to present the possibility of cooperation to the client
in a "timely fashion." 4 Of course, the lawyer must explain the advantages and
pitfalls. Not all cases provide the client with sufficient benefit for attempting to
cooperate. The government may decide that the information is not sufficiently
helpful, or that the client is not worthy of belief. The fact that, as a precondition of
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cooperation, the client will have to reveal all of her conduct throughout her life is a
factor that weighs heavily on the decision to cooperate.
The lawyer should consult the client as extensively as possible prior to the
time she engages the government in exploring cooperation, explaining to her the
necessity to provide information that the government deems truthful and complete.
The lawyer engages in a dance with the prosecution in exploring the information it
seeks from the client to gauge whether an agreement is likely. Knowing that the
government is interested in the kingpin, the lawyer has an obligation to discuss this
with the client, even if she suspects or believes that the client might be tempted to
commit perjury if she testifies against him. Temptation is not a sin, nor does it
give rise to an ethics violation. The lawyer, as zealous advocate, must explain (and
re-explain) to the client the real world consequences of cooperation-the
punishment for falsity, misrepresentation or omission of facts during the
cooperation process and in any subsequent testimony.
When a client enters into cooperation with the prosecutor, she wins the chance
for a 5Kl.1 letter, provided that the government finds her cooperation to be
truthful. Thereafter, typically she meets on many occasions with the prosecution
and/or agents. Her lawyer may not attend all of those sessions. Providing false
information to the government can result in a criminal charge for false statements
5
6
or obstruction of justice.
Let's say that at some point before the kingpin's trial, however, the
cooperating client tells her lawyer that her testimony "will be all lies" and that she
has "figured out what those prosecutors wanted her to say and she was prepared to
say it." When she amplifies, the lawyer believes that she is telling the truth about
her plan not to tell the truth.
I. WHAT Do I "KNow"
Alarm bells ring. Is the lawyer's "belief' "actual knowledge" that triggers an
ethical obligation? This is unlikely to be a case of the ethically impermissible
conscious avoidance of the truth.7 The defense lawyer is probably the last to know
what statements are false or whether the client intends to perjure herself.
No matter the extent of preparation for proffer sessions, defense lawyers are
often surprised by some of the facts that emerge during those sessions.
Contradictions abound. The lawyer may not be present during all of the proffer
sessions in which case, she certainly does not know the truth about statements
made, the areas explored by the prosecution or other information regarding the
client's prospective testimony about the kingpin. If present, the lawyer may be the
1 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) (conscious disregard as
knowledge).
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person in the room with the least amount of knowledge about whether the client's
statements are false.
Even if the client says that she provided false statements to the prosecution
during the proffer session, the lawyer may have no independent knowledge of the
falsity. It may be untrue that she intends to testify falsely. Maybe the client wants
the lawyer to believe that she is "tough" and will willingly lie for others. Maybe
she wants her attorney to believe that she is compelled to testify when she actually
chooses to cooperate. Maybe the fear of the danger of testifying has led her to
recant. Maybe she has a hidden agenda. The lawyer does not know, nor in these
circumstances is likely to obtain "actual knowledge" of falsity. Cooperators, with
conflicting emotions, may seek to rationalize their cooperation with the
government and engage in denial. For all the lawyer knows, the government may
have knowledge that the facts are accurate even if the client tells her lawyer that
these are "lies." Thus, the lawyer's "belief' that her protestations are truthful are
just that-beliefs.
On the other hand, the lawyer may be wary of the client who "confesses" that
she lied to the government. It is a rare occurrence that a client tells the lawyer that
she intends to testify falsely, thus caution is advised as to whether the client
intends to "set up" the lawyer or is having significant problems with cooperation.
However, even absent actual knowledge, the lawyer's belief is significant for
tactical and strategic reasons. The lawyer is obligated to counsel the client with
persuasive techniques about the minefield she walks on if she, in fact, intends to
provide false testimony. She faces loss of her hoped-for 5Kl.1 agreement, a
lengthy and enhanced prison sentence, potential criminal charges for false
statements, obstruction of justice, and perjury.
The ethical obligation is to be a steadfast, thoughtful, zealous advocate and
counsel the client diligently and, hopefully, persuasively. The client may lack an
understanding of the precarious situation she faces. She may be fearful. Maybe
she believes that she will be able to testify and be perceived as truthful. Perhaps
she is correct, but it is the lawyer's obligation to counsel her. Hopefully, the
attorney comes to understand why she has made a "confession" that she will lie.
Maybe the lawyer remains guarded but hopefully not. The lawyer hopes that the
client heeds her advice and provides truthful testimony.
II. WHAT IF I KNow?
What happens, however, if in an atypical case, the lawyer develops "actual
knowledge" that the client has presented false information to the government, and
that she does intend to testify falsely at the kingpin's trial?
The first obligation is one of remonstration. Hopefully this persuasive
technique will encourage her to correct the information that she has provided to the
government. The lawyer should firmly explain the perilous consequences she
faces if she does not correct the information, including the withdrawal of her
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counsel.8 The lawyer may bring in a second lawyer to reinforce her advice. If the
client agrees to correct her statements, the lawyer should navigate a relatively
graceful correction process. Lawyers should not underestimate the ability to repair
damage done during some cooperation sessions, notably because the witness is key
to the government's case.
If, however, the client refuses to correct the prior false statements, continues
to meet with the government in preparation for her testimony, and the lawyer
continues to counsel the client, the lawyer may run afoul of Rule 1.2(d) (assisting
an ongoing crime or fraud) if she does not withdraw.9 She may also be a necessary
witness in any future criminal prosecution of her client as a result of her
participation in the proffer sessions.'0 The necessary and most prudent course of
action is to seek withdrawal from representation. Perhaps another lawyer will
more successfully assist the client in avoiding catastrophic consequences.
Withdrawal is likely to be required under Rule 1.16(b)(2). "
Must the lawyer take other measures? Rule 3.3(b), which arguably applies,
does not adequately address this circumstance. That rule provides: "A lawyer who
represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person
intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct
related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.' 2
The letter of the rule requires such action only in an adjudicative proceeding.
Arguably, because the lawyer represents the client in a different proceeding from
the one in which the lawyer knows that her client has offered false information and
will offer false testimony, she has no ethical obligation to act in the kingpin's trial.
She is now a lawyer for a witness in a case with little control over that process.
She is neither offering her client's testimony to a court nor assisting her in
preparing the testimony. The client is now the agent of the prosecution and the
government bears responsibility for ensuring that the testimony is truthful.
Nor does the rule clearly impose a current obligation on the lawyer to the
tribunal that will accept her client's guilty plea if it is not clear that the client will
engage in a crime or fraud related to that proceeding.
Second, the rule does not specify the timing of such remedial measures. Even
if the rule were applicable to the kingpin's trial, remedial measures may be
premature. The kingpin may plead guilty, thereby avoiding a trial. The cooperator
may not be called to testify. Or, if the case continues, the client may change her
mind the moment before testifying or as she takes the stand. Although concern for
the integrity of the criminal justice system argues for revelation of the intended
8 See infra note 16 on withdrawal as an option.
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.2(d) (2009).
10 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.7(b) (2009).
1 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(2) (client persists in a course of criminal
conduct involving the lawyer's services).
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2009).
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perjury as soon as it is known by the lawyer, 13 the unique context of cooperation
suggests that no remedial action be contemplated until the testimony is reasonably
certain.
However, the lawyer, consistent with a more likely reading of Rule 3.3 and
the strategic best practice, may choose, after client consultation, to take the
remedial measure of telling the prosecution that the client should not enter into a
cooperation agreement without specifying details. 14  The message to the
government is clear. However, few clients would continue to trust a lawyer who
has revealed this or any further information to a court or prosecutor without
consent. This consequence of breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship
demonstrates why withdrawal-without additional remedial measures-may be a
better option for resolution of these intractable issues.
While withdrawal has been criticized as an option that only passes the
problem to the next lawyer, and does not protect the integrity of the criminal
justice system, it is the one that best preserves the delicate balance between client
confidentiality and a lawyer's duty to the system.' 5
Nevertheless, the ethics rules require reasonable remedial measures,
presumably not withdrawal. The contours of such measures include "mak[ing]
such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation"
including information that is otherwise protected as confidential information.'
6
However, no court has yet determined that revelation of client confidences is
consistent with the client's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
17
Consequently, a lawyer who withdraws but does not provide further information to
the court or the government has a reasoned argument that this position is consistent
with the client's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.' 8 The indigent
defender version of the "noisy withdrawal" ought to be sufficient for the integrity
of the criminal justice system.' 9
13 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 29.15 (3d ed.
Supp. 2010).
14 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2009).
15 Ethicists have, and will continue, to differ on this point. See Monroe H. Freedman, Client
Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1939 (1988)
(arguing that withdrawal merely passes the buck); John Wesley Hall, Jr., Handling Client Perjury
After Nix v. Whiteside: A Criminal Defense Lawyer's View, 42 MERCER L. REv. 769 (1991)
(advocating withdrawal). See also Hazard & Hodes, supra note 13, § 29.16 (withdrawal does the
least damage of competing policies).
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2009).
17 See Freedman, supra note 15. But see Hazard & Hodes supra note 13, § 29.20 (arguing
that the Fifth Amendment argument is "unpersuasive").
18 Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133
(2008).
19 In prior versions of Rule 1.6 commentary, "noisy withdrawal" (without disaffirmance) in
the corporate context was understood to be an acknowledgement of fraudulent conduct.
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The prevalent use of informants and cooperating witnesses and the culture of
cooperation have led to a profound discomfort among many criminal defense
lawyers about their role as zealous advocates for the client. The ethical choices are
often difficult for the criminal defense lawyer and can only properly be discussed
in tandem with the issue of the prosecutor's obligation to "do justice" in the
context where there are so few guidelines for their discretion. 20 This problem
focuses upon the criminal defense lawyer's ethical responsibilities, but ultimately
the issue is one for prosecutors as well. Ethics rules and laws should focus upon
the proper use of such informants, seeking to ensure that the police and prosecution
present truthful testimony from cooperators.
20 Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice? ", 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
608 (1999).
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